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Decentralization includes different types of policy reforms aiming to shift powers from 
centralized to more localized institutions, such as sub-national units of administration, local 
government, the civil society and/or local user groups. It has gained increasing support, 
particularly in the realm of natural resources management (NRM). Moving towards more 
decentralized forms of NRM can, however, involve remarkable institutional challenges. 
Understanding the factors that can facilitate and/or constrain decentralization is, therefore, 
critical in overcoming such institutional challenges, as well as (re)designing and 
implementing more suitable policies. 
 In Australia, catchment management – a watershed management initiative – is an 
example of moving decision-making for NRM from the State to the catchment (watershed) 
level. New South Wales (NSW) was the first Australian State to adopt catchment 
management as a state-wide statutory policy, in the late 1980s. Catchment management has 
since undergone a number of institutional changes. Specific legislation, for instance, have 
been introduced and reformed, such as the Catchment Management Act 1989, the Catchment 
Management Regulation 1999, and the Catchment Management Authorities Act 2003. 
Consequently, Catchment Management Committees, which operated in the 1990s were 
replaced by Catchment Management Boards in 2000, which in turn, have recently been 
replaced with Catchment Management Authorities.  
 This paper presents preliminary findings from a broader study on the NSW catchment 
management initiative. The paper examines decentralized approaches to NRM as part of such 
a NSW initiative. Catchment management institutions are analyzed by applying the 
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Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in combination with the recent 
theorizing on decentralization of NRM.  
 
Decentralized Approaches to NRM: The NSW Catchment Management Initiative 
Decentralized approaches have gained increasing support in several countries, particularly in 
the realm of NRM (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002b). In 
Australia, catchment management – a watershed management initiative – is an example of 
moving decision-making for NRM from the State1 to the catchment (watershed) level.  
 New South Wales (NSW) was the first Australian State to adopt catchment 
management as a state-wide statutory policy in the late 1980s. Catchment management has 
since undergone a number of institutional changes (Table 1). It was initially adopted as an 
institutional response to ineffective NRM regimes characterized by sectoral and fragmented 
approaches. Catchment management aimed at improving the coordinated use of land, water, 
vegetation and other natural resources on a watershed basis, emphasizing community 
participation and voluntary implementation (NSWSCS, 1987). 
 
Table 1: Catchment Management Institutions in NSW. 
YEAR Institutional 
levels < 1980s 1989 1999 2003 
 
Constitutional-
choice 
 
Catchment 
Management Act 
 
 
Catchment 
Management 
Regulation 
 
 
Catchment 
Management 
Authorities Act 
 
Collective-
choice 
Sectoral and 
fragmented 
NRM 
institutions  
(at all levels) 
 
Catchment 
Management Trusts 
and Committees 
 
 
Catchment 
Management 
Boards 
 
Catchment 
Management 
Authorities 
 
Operational-
choice 
 
 
 Local groups, resource users, government agencies, catchment 
management bodies, Local government etc. 
 
 Catchment management was legally institutionalized in 1989, with the introduction of 
the NSW Catchment Management Act. Under this Act, Catchment Management Committees 
(CMCs) were established to coordinate NRM at the watershed level2. Each CMC was formed 
                                                 
1 In Australia, States and Territories have primary responsibility for natural resources management. 
Nevertheless, the Federal government has exerted significant influence through national programs jointly funded 
with State and Territories governments (e.g., the National Heritage Trust). 
2 A few Catchment Management Trusts were also established under the Catchment Management Act. Such 
Trusts are not examined in this paper. 
 3
by a majority of land holders or resource users, environmental interests and Local and State 
government representatives. Committee members were appointed by the responsible 
Minister, usually from a panel nominated by particular interest groups (e.g., Nature 
Conservation Council, industry groups) and/or through public advertisement (i.e., self 
nomination). Despite being statutory, the CMCs were advisory bodies only, e.g., the 
catchment management plans had no legal authority; implementation relied mostly on 
voluntary action and, to some extent, on the provisions of related policies.  
 The Catchment Management Regulation 1999 replaced the CMCs with 18 Catchment 
Management Boards (CMBs) (NSW, 1999). The membership composition was modified to 
include representatives from the Aboriginal community, in addition to representatives from 
resource users, nature conservation, local and state government (DLWC, 2000). The short life 
of the CMBs was dedicated primarily to the development of an integrated catchment 
management plan (the Catchment Blueprint) for their respective areas. The Blueprints were 
also advisory documents. They would, however, guide NRM investments in the catchment 
(DLWC, 2000). 
 In early 2004, the CMBs were disbanded and 13 Catchment Management Authorities 
(CMAs) were established under the Catchment Authorities Act 2003. The CMAs are 
independent bodies that report directly to the Minister, and are no longer under the 
responsibility of a State government agency, as were the CMCs and CMBs. Each of the 
CMAs’ board comprises of between five and seven non-ministerial office holders, appointed 
based on their knowledge and skills, rather than on representation of particular interest 
groups. In addition to an advisory role, similar to their predecessors, the CMAs have 
governing and operational roles (NSW, 2003). A distinguishing feature of the CMAs is the 
application of a corporate governance approach, i.e., the use of private sector management 
methods, operating thus as public enterprises.  
 The development of catchment management in NSW has been characterized by major 
institutional changes. Such changes include the creation, review and reform of the 
arrangements defining the participants in catchment management institutions and the type of 
authority/power transferred to these institutions. Institutional challenges to decentralization of 
NRM related to these arrangements are the focus of this study. A framework for analyzing 
these institutional arrangements is presented below. 
 
 4
A Framework of Decentralized NRM Institutions 
Decentralization involves the formal transfer of powers from a central government to actors 
and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territory hierarchy (Agrawal 
and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002a). It includes different types of policy 
reforms aiming to shift powers from centralized to more localized institutions, such as sub-
national units of administration, local government, the civil society and/or local user groups 
(Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001). Current thinking on decentralization of NRM has promoted 
more democratic and rights-based approaches (Larson and Ribot, 2004). Political or 
democratic decentralization (referred hereafter as decentralization) takes place when powers 
and resources are transferred to institutions representative of, and accountable to, local 
populations (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002a). It is regarded as a strategy of 
governance to facilitate power shifts closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of 
power (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). By bringing decision-making closer and making it open 
and accountable to local populations, decentralization is believed to lead to increased equity 
and efficiency in NRM (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2002a). In 
this context, effective decentralization is defined by inclusive and accountable processes 
where local entities are empowered with meaningful discretionary authority over the 
management of natural resources that are relevant to local populations (Ribot, 2002a, b). 
 Institutions can be defined in terms of formal rules and informal norms, which 
constrain or foster human behavior, and are adopted by individuals operating within or across 
organizations (Ostrom, 1999). Such rules, both formal and informal, can be classified into 
seven broad categories, i.e., position, boundary, choice, aggregation, information, payoff and 
scope rules (Ostrom and Crawford, 2005). In this paper these rules are conceptualized as 
follow: 
• Position rules specify the participants (individuals or entities) and their roles in a 
decentralized institution;  
• Boundary rules define who is eligible to take part in this institution and how 
participants are selected;  
• Choice rules specify the authority transferred to the institution;  
• Aggregation rules refer to decision-making procedures, including arrangements to 
aggregate the preferences of the public and stakeholders into decision-making;  
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• Information rules define the arrangements for information exchange among 
participants, and between participants and other stakeholders, the public and other 
institutions;  
• Payoff rules refer to the incentives and disincentives in terms of resources (e.g., 
human resources and funding) available for the institution to exercise their 
authority;  
• Scope rules define the functional scope and the geographic domain that can be 
affected by a decentralized institution. 
 
 To analyze decentralized approaches to NRM in the context of this study, a set of 
evaluative criteria was developed by combining the recent theorizing on decentralization of 
NRM (e.g., Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001; 
Ribot, 2002a; Ribot, 2002b) and the institutional aspects of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 
2005), as conceptualized above. The resulting evaluative framework is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Evaluative framework of decentralized NRM institutions 
RULES EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
Position Participation is representative of and accountable to local populations and all 
relevant stakeholders. Participation is thus inclusive in nature. 
 
Boundary Selection of participants allows for representative and accountable 
participation. Selection processes are deemed to be as legitimate and 
democratic as possible. 
 
Choice Meaningful authority to affect NRM outcomes is transferred from the central 
government to decentralized institutions. Such authority is exercised in an 
independent fashion. 
 
Aggregation 
 
Decision-making aggregates the preferences, values and needs of those who 
are mainly affected by the exercise of power  
 
Information Communication and interaction with local populations, stakeholders and the 
central government entail mechanisms for reporting and monitoring 
performance, enhancing accountability particularly to local populations. 
 
Payoff Adequate resources are transferred allowing decentralized institutions to 
exercise their authority. 
 
Scope Authority is transferred to a lower political-administrative and territory 
hierarchy, e.g., sub-national units of administration; local government; the 
civil society and/or local user groups; watersheds, sub-watersheds or 
bioregions. 
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Methods 
The framework of decentralization of NRM conceptualized above was used to examine 
challenges to catchment management institutions in NSW. Institutional rules comprising the 
CMCs, CMBs and CMAs were assessed against this evaluative framework. Sources of 
information and data for this study included relevant documents, such as legislation, reports, 
reviews, as well as consultations with individuals and organizations involved with catchment 
management in NSW. Data collection and analysis followed the tradition of qualitative 
research methods (e.g., Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). In addition, this paper 
drew on case studies undertaken by this author as part of a broader study on NSW catchment 
management, as well as other Australian cases available in the literature. 
 
Examining Constraints to Catchment Management Institutions 
Position Rules 
CMCs and CMBs comprised around 20 representatives of selected stakeholder groups, i.e., as 
seen above, landholders and/or resource users, Local government authorities, officers of State 
government agencies, representatives of environmental interests and, in the case of the 
CMBs, Aboriginal interests. Participation in CMCs and CMBs was limited in terms of 
representation and inclusiveness. Aboriginal groups and people of non-English background, 
for example, were under-represented in CMCs (AACM, 1996). In contrast, landholders 
and/or resource users were over-represented in CMCs and CMBs. Participation in the current 
CMAs comprise of between 5 and 7 non-ministerial position holders with expertise in areas 
related to NRM, regardless of the membership they might have to any interest group3. 
 
Boundary Rules 
The constraints to participation and representation outlined above are explained primarily by 
boundary rules. The 1989 Catchment Management Act required that the majority of members 
of the CMCs and CMBs comprised landholders or resource users (NSW, 1989), which 
resulted in over-representation of these stakeholder groups. Boundary rules, as specified in 
the legislation, applied to all CMCs and CMBs across NSW, which were therefore limited in 
                                                 
3  Board members of CMAs may come from a diverse background, such as Aboriginal and Farmer backgrounds. 
They, however, are not to represent the stakeholder group they come from. 
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catering for the different socioeconomic and political realities of the catchments; and, 
consequently, for representative and accountable participation. Selection of participants of the 
current CMAs on the basis of expertise is exclusive and contravenes representation.  
 Ministerial appointment of participants to decentralized institutions is not a 
democratic process and raises questions about legitimacy and accountability to local 
populations. In the past, the legitimacy of the selection process of catchment management 
institutions were undermined by interventions of elected officials in the selection process of 
some CMCs, in order to fit political interests (Margerum, 1996). Appointed boards, as part of 
the corporate governance arrangements currently used in the Australian public sector, have 
been questioned in terms of accountability, formal authority and safeguards to protect the 
public interest (see e.g., Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005).  
  
Choice Rules 
The roles of the CMCs and CMBs were primarily advisory in nature. As mentioned above, 
the catchment management plans, for instance, despite being statutory documents, were not 
legally biding. The much needed commitment, collaboration and responsibility to voluntary 
implementation comprised some of the major challenges. Participants in CMCs and CMBs 
usually did not have the authority to commit on behalf of their organizations. Furthermore, 
the roles of catchment management institutions, such as the CMCs, were usually ignored 
particularly by State government agencies (AACM, 1996).  
 In contrast, CMAs have been considerably empowered in terms of authority to 
implement NRM decisions and actions, as they have been assigned governing and operational 
roles. However, such powers can be constrained due to the influence of State and Federal 
government in setting requirements and priorities at the strategic level. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on the use of corporate governance procedures, where activities may be largely 
rationalized – i.e., closely planned, organized, coordinated and controlled – can result in 
processes that are overly driven and controlled by the central government (Boxelaar et al., 
2006). Autonomy and flexibility occurs, therefore, within the rules set by the government, as 
CMAs needs to comply with procedures that are aligned with and reinforce government 
powers.  
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Aggregation Rules 
Direct representation of certain stakeholder groups in decision-making might have comprised 
the main aggregation mechanism in the CMCs and CMBs. Communication and interaction 
(information rules) between participants with their “constituency” would lead to the 
aggregation of their preferences, values and needs into decision-making. As seen above, 
achieving accountable representation has, however, been an issue in catchment management 
institutions. Input from the public and stakeholders was also sought by using ad hoc 
aggregation mechanisms such working groups, sub-committees, stakeholders’ fora, and 
consultations. Government priorities and requirements as well as the corporate governance 
approach applied to CMAs might not always provide opportunities for adequate aggregation 
of public and stakeholder preferences (Boxelaar et al., 2006). Additional challenges to 
aggregation results from the larger areas of operation of CMAs. These areas can encompass 
more diverse NRM issues and actors, whose preferences should be aggregated into decision-
making (see scope rules below). 
 
Information Rules  
Despite using various procedures (both formal and informal) for information exchange, 
communication and interaction with the public and stakeholders has, in some instances, been 
perceived to be similar to traditional approaches undertaken in less participatory initiatives. 
As the Wentworth Group puts it, “Despite the rhetoric, communities continue to be consulted 
rather than engaged” (TWG, 2002). That is, public and stakeholders consultations have, in 
many cases, figured primarily as a single centralized mechanism. The consultations 
undertaken during the development of the Catchment Blueprints by the CMBs, for example, 
have been considered by participants as time consuming and ineffective. Furthermore, the 
somewhat frequent changes in NRM institutions have resulted in “burn-out” of participants 
and the public, driving them away from the process.  
Other important aspects of the information rules refer to arrangements for reporting 
and monitoring performance. In contrast to CMCs that presented loose mechanisms for 
reporting and monitoring (AACM, 1996), CMAs are required to produce a number of reports 
and plans. These reports and plans are subject to recommendation and/or approval by other 
entities. CMAs are also subject to external financial and performance audits. These reporting, 
monitoring and auditing processes aim to ensure that State and Federal government priorities 
are met and that stronger accountability within the organization and to central governments is 
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in place. The emphasis on upward accountability can, however, undermine its downward 
dimension (i.e., the accountability to local populations and stakeholders).  
 
Payoff Rules 
Catchment management has in the past been characterized by limited resources, both in terms 
of support staff and funding. CMCs, for example, were usually supported by one or two staff. 
The funding available for catchment management was largely captured by State government 
agencies (AACM, 1996). At present, catchment management institutions have, on the other 
hand, been given substantially more resources. Some of the CMAs, for instance, employ 
some 40 staff. The initial announced budget for CMAs was of A$ 436.5 million over a period 
of 4 years (DIPNR, 2004). These allocations have been provided jointly by the NSW and 
Federal governments largely from national programs (e.g., the Natural Heritage Trust [NHT] 
and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality [NAP]). In addition, A$ 100 
million would be transferred, over 4 years, in staff and resources from the NSW Department 
of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources to the CMAs (DIPNR, 2004). The use of 
these resources, however, needs to comply with the requirements and priorities of the NSW 
and Federal programs. 
 
Scope Rules 
The overall functional scope of catchment management institutions in NSW has been the 
coordination of NRM at the catchment or regional level. The geographical domain has, 
however, been enlarged over time, shifting from local to regional scales. Several CMCs, east 
to the Great Dividing Range4, operated within discrete local catchment or sub-catchment 
areas. CMAs have, on the other hand, jurisdiction over large regional domains. The Southern 
Rivers CMA, for example, encompasses an area which was once the responsibility of 7 
CMCs. The larger geographic domains of the CMAs allow for a more regional and strategic 
focus in addressing problems of regional, State and National significance (e.g., biodiversity 
and vegetation management). Larger geographical scopes, however, have implications and 
can pose challenges to other institutional rules, such as position, boundaries, information, 
aggregation and payoff rules. These challenges include achieving accountable and 
                                                 
4 The Great Dividing Range is a main watershed in Eastern Australia, comprising a series of plateaus and 
mountain ranges parallel the Eastern coast. 
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representative participation of potentially more diverse populations and stakeholders; 
communicating and interacting with these populations and stakeholders; aggregating their 
preferences into decision-making; and securing adequate resources to carry out NRM actions 
and activities. 
 
Conclusions 
Institutional arrangements used in the NSW catchment management initiative have failed, to 
some extent, to meet each of the criteria of a decentralized institution. Achieving accountable 
representation of catchment populations and stakeholders; securing meaningful and, in 
particular, more independent powers from the NSW and Federal governments; and 
establishing effective arrangements for aggregating the preferences of the catchment 
populations and stakeholders into decision-making, were the major challenges identified in 
moving towards more democratic forms of decentralization. This paper suggests that, despite 
the rhetoric of decentralization, the NSW and Federal governments still resist to truly transfer 
powers to local/regional NRM institutions.  
 Despite the constraints, catchment management institutions have produced some 
positive outcomes (which were not explored in this paper), such as promoting environmental 
awareness and education, engaging some sectors of community and industry, and working in 
collaboration with other organizations and local groups. Overcoming the constraints and 
improving outcomes will require changes in the institutional rules in use. Future research 
should focus on why and how these rules have been created and changed so that adequate 
forms of intervention can be devised.  
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